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Emerging Cyber Threats  
Report for 2009
Data, Mobility and Questions of Responsibility will  
Drive Cyber Threats in 2009 and Beyond
On October 15, 2008, the Georgia Tech Information Security Center (GTISC) hosted its annual summit on 
emerging security threats and countermeasures affecting the digital world. At the conclusion of the event, GTISC 
released this Emerging Cyber Threats Report—outlining the top five information security threats and challenges 
facing both consumer and business users in 2009. This year’s summit participants include security experts from 
the public sector, private enterprise and academia, reinforcing GTISC’s collaborative approach to addressing 
information security technology and policy challenges. 
“As one of the leading academic research centers focused on information security, GTISC believes strongly that 
a proactive and collaborative approach to understanding emerging threats will help us develop more effective 
information security technologies and strategies,” said Mustaque Ahamad, director of GTISC. “The annual 
GTISC Security Summit on Emerging Cyber Security Threats and our annual Emerging Cyber Threats Report 
seek to give us a better understanding of the cyber security challenges we will face in the years ahead.”
GTISC research and advance interviews with key information security experts from government, industry and 
academia uncovered five specific trends and some profound questions that will drive threats and countermeasures 




Threats to VoIP and mobile devices
The evolving cyber crime economy
In an effort to inform the broader community about current and future risks, this report will describe each 
emerging threat, existing or potential countermeasures, and how the threat may evolve in the coming year. In 
addition, our experts will offer their opinion on the role that Internet security education and regulation may play 
in further preventing the spread of cyber crime.  
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Malware
A total of 28940 different malicious and potentially unwanted programs were detected on users’ computers 
in August. That is an increase of more than 8,000 on July's figures and points to a significant increase in the 
number of in-the-wild threats. 
http://www.kaspersky.com/news?id=207575678
“We are so conditioned to click on links, and the bad guys know this,” said Naraine. “The email lures, the 
enticements and the personalization of malware attacks are getting much better. Social engineering attacks 
on social networks are beginning to explode and will only get worse.”
Ryan Naraine - Security Evangelist, Kaspersky Lab, Americas
Emerging threats for 2009…all data-driven!
Data will continue to be the primary motive behind future cyber crime—whether targeting traditional fixed 
computing or mobile applications. According to security expert George Heron, “It’s all about the data,” 
whether botnets, malware, blended threats, mobile threats or cyber warfare attacks. And Heron expects data 
to drive cyber attacks for years to come. The data motive is woven through all five emerging threat categories, 
beginning with malware.
Ryan Naraine, security evangelist for Kaspersky, 
believes that malware delivery—the first step in creating a 
bot—will become more insidious by taking advantage of 
poorly configured Web sites, social networking sites and 
false domains. 
“We are projecting a 10-fold increase in malware objects 
detected in 2008,” said Naraine. “This is ‘hockey-stick’ 
growth driven by identity theft and data-focused cyber 
crime.”
Naraine expects criminal senders to use better social 
engineering techniques to cloak malcode in what 
appears to be legitimate email with acceptable Web links. 
For example:
A Facebook message sent from one friend to another 
includes a link to a YouTube video of interest to the 
recipient. The recipient clicks on the link supposedly sent 
by his/her friend, and then sees a prompt to install the 
latest version of Flash Player in order to watch the video 
clip. The user clicks to install the update, but actually 
installs a piece of malware on the machine, effectively 
involving the computer in a botnet.
As cyber criminals move beyond mass-distribution 
style phishing scams, they are learning how to localize 
and personalize their attacks for better penetration. Social 
networking sites like MySpace, Facebook and others will 
likely be used as delivery mechanisms to get unsuspecting 
users to a malicious Web site link in order to deliver 
malware. In the coming year, GTISC and other security 
experts also expect more targeted spear-phishing vehicles 
to install malware and/or steal data. For example:
Attackers might target customers of a local credit union 
with a spoofed email referencing a local news story of 
interest. When customers click the bogus link in the email, 
the malware is installed and can log keystrokes and mine 
other personal data to be sent back to a malicious bot 
master or cyber criminal.
Naraine cited computing mono-cultures and slow or 
non-existent desktop application patching as fueling the 
malware/botnet crisis. “When you have nearly 100 percent 
of users standardized on a single application, it means that 
a single point of security failure can lead to infection of an 
entire computing ecosystem,” said Naraine.
Naraine’s research indicates that some of the largest 
botnets are comprised of corporate machines. “It takes 
the average corporation two to three months to apply a 
Windows patch across all devices, so malware and botnets 
will continue to take advantage of known vulnerabilities 
within enterprise environments.”
On the bright side, many software vendors are now 
shipping auto-patch/update capability with each new 
software release. Firefox, Adobe and Apple all do this. 
And Naraine believes that Microsoft operating system 
security has improved with each successive release. The 
auto-update features help both corporate and consumer 
end users stay up to date with patches—which eliminates a 
lot of “low-hanging fruit” for the cyber crime community.
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Botnets
Botnets Continue to Grow and Transform
Bot Army Name Number of Binaries Distinct Compromised Hosts  
in Typical Enterprise
Distinct Binaries per  
Compromise
RAT-SZ-1 10,493 155 67.7
Sality-1 886 18 49.2
IRC-VR-1 804 75 10.7
IRC-SD-1 541 11 40.2
Poebot-1 369 2 184.5
RAT-DL-1 212 14 15.1
Metcash-1 194 47 4.1
IRC-SD-2 139 21 6.6
RAT-SM-1 54 4 13.5
Kraken 48 301 0.2
1 http://www.darkreading.com/document.asp?doc_id=161524
2 Source: Damaballa; http://www.damballa.com/downloads/press/GartnerITSecSummit_Q2Research_PRFINAL_2008-06-02_.pdf
In 2008, botnets have become worse—a trend expected 
to continue next year. GTISC estimated in last year’s report 
that 10 percent of online computers were part of botnets, 
groups of computers infected with malicious code and 
unknowingly controlled by a malicious master. This year, 
GTISC researchers estimate that botnet-affected machines 
may comprise 15 percent of online computers.
“Compared with viruses and spam, botnets are growing 
at a faster rate,” said Wenke Lee, an associate professor 
at GTISC and a leading botnet researcher. Lee cites three 
unavoidable factors that are spurring botnet growth:
Infection can occur even through  • 
legitimate Web sites
Bot exploits/malware delivery mechanisms  • 
are gaining sophistication and better  
obfuscation techniques
Users do not have to do anything to become • 
infected; simply rendering a Web page can  
launch a botnet exploit
Bots can be delivered to a machine in a variety of ways— 
via Trojans, emails, an unauthorized instant message 
client or an infected Web site. Once installed, bots lie low 
to avoid notice by antivirus and anti-spyware technology. 
Periodically, the bot communicates to a “command and 
control” server and waits for a response. The commu-
nication—using the command and control server as an 
intermediary—can keep the malicious bot master’s 
identity hidden. 
Lee points out the distinction between botnets and 
malware: “What we think of as malware can be 
responsible for turning a machine into a bot,” said Lee. 
“But traditional malware is a single-purpose attack. 
A bot actually remains on the machine, maintains 
a command and control mechanism to enable 
communication with the bot master, and can update 
itself based on those communications. The updates 
enable new bot communication and malicious capabilities, 
and are often used to avoid detection.”
Bot communications are designed to look like normal 
(Web) traffic using accepted ports, so even firewalls and 
intrusion prevention systems have a hard time isolating 
bot messages. Lee agreed, “It’s very difficult to filter bot 
traffic at the network edge since it uses http and every 
enterprise allows http traffic.”
Prompted to act in unison, bots become bot armies that 
harness considerable computing power to engage in a 
variety of malicious activities, including:
—  Data theft (social security numbers, credit card    
 information, trade secrets, etc.)
—  Denial of service attacks
—  Spam delivery
— DNS server spoofing
According to a report compiled by Panda Labs, in 2Q 
2008, 10 million bot computers were used to distribute 
spam and malware across the Internet each day1. 
Damballa continues to discover that 3-5 percent of 
enterprise assets are compromised on average by targeted 
threats such as bots—even in the presence of the best 
and most up-to-date security. Leading industry analysts 
predict this number to be even higher. 
Most botnet command and control sites can be traced 
back to China2. But Lee cautions that this statistic could 
be misinterpreted because "a lot of Chinese are using 
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Security experts consulted by GTISC believe cyber 
warfare will accompany traditional military interaction 
more often in the years ahead. They expect it will also 
play a more shadowy role in attempts by antagonist 
nations to subvert the U.S. economy and infrastructure.
Consider the cyber attacks that occurred between Russia 
and Georgia earlier this year as a model for military 
cyber engagements in 2009 and beyond. Don Jackson, 
director of threat intelligence for SecureWorks, compiled 
the following research to implicate direct Russian govern-
ment involvement in cyber attacks against Georgia:
Physical and cyber attack targets and timing align:
Logs of DDoS traffic and changes in network • 
routing indicate that Russian cyber warfare 
operations coincided almost exactly with the final 
“all clear” for Russian Air Force attacks sometime 
between 0600 and 0700 on August 9, 2008. 
Both cyber attack targets (media outlets and  • 
local government communication systems) and 
air force targets were located in the Georgian  
city of Gori.
The exact timing of cyber attacks against new • 
classes of targets in Gori and Russian Air Force 
attacks indicated coordination between known 
hacking groups and military operators.
Source of Russian cyber attacks against Georgia:
The vast majority of Georgian Internet traffic  • 
is routed through Turkey and Russia. As of 
August 10, 2008, traffic routed through Turkey 
was almost completely blocked, and IP traffic 
through Russia (via Azerbaijan) was slow  
and effectively unusable.
Russian government-run Rostelecom conducted • 
most of the routing changes that blocked traffic to 
Georgian IP address space.
The Moscow-based COMSTAR network also • 
cooperated with government demands to follow 
suit, as did other network operators that control 
routing through the ostensibly neutral Moscow 
Internet Exchange (MSK-IX).
DDoS and cache poisoning attempts targeting • 
DNS servers for major Georgian networks were 
also launched from the state-operated Rostelecom 
and Moscow-based COMSTAR networks. These 
attempts utilized the same tools, tactics and 
target lists as attacks from portions of Turkish 
networks controlled by former associates of the 
Russian Business Network (RBN). The associates 
are believed to have connections to local St. 
Petersburg government, the former powerbase 
of Putin and those now in charge of the FSB state 
security organization.  
Attack types:
In addition to DDoS attacks against Georgian • 
media outlets and government Web sites, 
researchers observed:
—  Route hijacking
—  Brute force server compromise
— Data theft
—  Multi-factor DDoS attacking network 
  and application layers
—  Defacement and hosting of fake Georgian  
 Web pages containing misinformation 
 and propaganda.
Cyber Warfare
pirated software which doesn’t receive security updates.” 
  According to Lee, “That means many Chinese 
computers are rife with vulnerabilities, making them 
a haven for botnet command and control sites.” 
Botnets en masse are considered a bot army and these 
malicious computing forces may be used to conduct 
cyber warfare in the future. In addition, bot payloads are 
becoming increasingly complex to avoid evolving security 
measures. According to Lee’s research at GTISC, several 
recent bot variants have exhibited more than 100 distinct 
binary payloads used to hide the communications path 
and to vary the command and control IP address. The net 
effect makes botnets and bot masters harder to track. 
However, new technologies can pinpoint the Internet 
communications between botnets and bot masters and 
shut down the vital links required for cyber crime and 
cyber warfare. Signature-based defenses like antivirus 
and intrusion detection are no match for the subtle 
communications between bot and bot master. But newer 
behavior analysis techniques can help identify bots 
without signatures.
Lee’s research team at GTISC is developing algorithms 
to analyze traffic patterns from internal machines to 
outside machines. Strange anomalies in connection 
duration, time of day, or type of information uploaded/ 
downloaded can indicate a botnet command and 
control attempt. Lee’s research also examines how 
botnets use the Internet infrastructure. For example, 
look-up requests to DNS servers might provide 
information on which domain is used for botnet 
communications. In addtion, global sensor networks are 
now using specialized algorithms to pinpoint bot army 
communications. Once the command and control links 
are found and disrupted, the bot army threat can be 
neutralized as long as layered security is already in place.
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Some DDoS attacks, route hijacking, and system 
intrusions originated from sources not previously 
affiliated with known hacking groups and appear to 
have been coordinated in a manner that would allow 
attackers to disable or intercept Georgian government 
communications in accordance with Russian military and 
intelligence objectives.
Jon Ramsey, chief technology officer for SecureWorks at-
tributes increasing cyber warfare activity to the following:
The low cost to launch cyber attacks  • 
compared with physical attacks
The lack of cyber defenses• 
The “plausible deniability” the Internet affords• 
The lack of “cyber rules of engagement” in  • 
conflicts between nation states 
George Heron, founder of BlueFin Security and former 
chief scientist for McAfee believes cyber warfare will play a 
significant role between China and the U.S. “Cyber threats 
originating from China are very real and growing,” said 
Heron. “Other evidence supports this, such as the majority 
of bot masters being traced back to China, along with 
malware and other disruptive threats.”
Heron pointed to the U.S. transportation system infra-
structure, the telecommunications system, nuclear energy 
plant communications, the water supply IT infrastructure 
and other entities as prime cyber targets of enemy nations.
“We now know that it only takes infiltrating the DNS 
operator vulnerability to subvert an entire DNS sector,” 
Heron continued. “Cyber warfare efforts could take this 
approach to exploit vulnerable servers and gateways 
controlling the power grid or water/dam flow control.”  
Howard A. Schmidt, a GTISC professor of practice agrees. 
“Our critical infrastructure systems are fundamentally 
dependent on the Internet and IP-based technology, 
and there are interdependencies between them that our 
enemies will seek to exploit,” said Schmidt. “Cyber warfare 
completely evens the playing field as developing nations 
and large nations with a formidable military presence can 
both launch equally damaging attacks over the Web.”
The U.S. government is already bracing for the inevi-
tability of cyber warfare and hosted the second annual 
Cyber Storm exercise in March 2008—involving nine 
states, four foreign governments, 18 federal agencies and 
40 private companies in a weeklong cyber attack scenario3.
“Cyber Storm II is a successful instance of public and 
private partnership to identify cyber warfare threats and 
plan effective countermeasures,” said Heron. “We need 
more information sharing and more collaboration like this 
to defend our national interests against an onslaught of 
cyber terrorism.”
Schmidt advocates a three-step approach to bolstering 
U.S. cyber defenses:
Identify the Internet-enabled systems we depend • 
on and also the interdependencies between them.
Develop a comprehensive plan to protect those • 
systems, including roles and responsibilities, 
vulnerability identification and remediation, 
threat mitigation and response.
Design information security for the future • 
as software improvements, network 
enhancements and new technologies like mobile 
communications gain traction.
Threats to VoIP and Mobile Convergence
“The future threat goes beyond what we think of as cyber-espionage and intellectual property theft,  
although that certainly remains a factor,” said Heron. “I think we’re going to see more technologically savvy, 
state-sponsored attacks to the IT systems that support foundational services here in the U.S.”
George Heron - Founder, BlueFin Security
3 Source: Federal Computer Week, Cyber Storm II Stirring; Feb. 29, 2008; http://www.fcw.com/online/news/151806-1.html
The cell phone is becoming an entirely new tool— 
especially outside the U.S., where accessing the Internet 
from a mobile device can provide a better experience 
than traditional fixed computing. VoIP technology also 
continues to improve and will rival landline and mobile 
communications in terms of reliability and call quality. 
As Internet telephony and mobile computing handle more 
and more data, they will become more frequent targets of 
cyber crime.
From the outset, VoIP infrastructure has been vulnerable 
to the same types of attacks that plague other networked 
computing architectures. When voice is digitized, encoded, 
compressed into packets and exchanged over IP 
networks, it is susceptible to misuse. Cyber criminals will 
be drawn to the VoIP medium to engage in voice fraud, data 
theft and other scams—similar to the problems email has 
experienced. Denial of service, remote code execution and 
botnets all apply to VoIP networks, and will become more 
problematic for mobile devices as well.
“Criminals know that VoIP can be used in 
scams to steal personal and financial data so voice 
spam and voice phishing are not going away” said Tom 
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“Most people have been trained to enter social security numbers, credit card numbers, bank account 
numbers, etc. over the phone while interacting with voice response systems,” said Cross. “Criminals will ex-
ploit this social conditioning to perpetrate voice phishing and identity theft. At the same time, customers will 
demand better availability from phone service than they would from an ISP, so the threat of a DoS attack 
might compel carriers to pay out on a blackmail scam.”
Tom Cross - X-Force Researcher, IBM Internet Security Systems
“At this point, mobile device capability is far ahead of security,” said Traynor. “We’ll start to see the botnet 
problem infiltrate the mobile world in 2009.”
Patrick Traynor -  Assistant Professor, School of Computer Science at Georgia Tech,  
and member of the Georgia Tech Information Security Center
Cross,a researcher with the IBM Internet Security Sys-
tems X-Force team. “Denial of service will also continue 
to be a significant threat to VoIP. If a large number of VoIP 
phones become infected by malware and flood a network 
with traffic, the results could be extremely disruptive. We 
expect some cyber criminals to attempt to blackmail 
carriers based on a DoS attack scenario.”
According to Cross, large telecom companies in Europe 
are now servicing customers with VoIP. And where phone 
service is concerned, users have a different mentality about 
sharing personal information and a higher expectation 
of quality.
On the bright side, Cross believes the IT and telecom 
communities have learned valuable security lessons from 
the spam and phishing problems that have plagued the 
Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP). 
“VoIP providers and users want to avoid the spam crisis 
that has inundated email,” said Cross. “Current research 
efforts at university-based centers like GTISC are studying 
how reputation networks based on inherited trust could 
be applied to VoIP to prevent voice fraud. In this type of 
system, good security reputations will improve VoIP peer-
ing and call ranking so that legitimate calls get through, 
and voice spam and phishing are blocked.”
Cross also cited the need for intrusion prevention 
systems at the VoIP carrier level, along with endpoint 
security for Session Initiated Protocol (SIP) phones and 
other VoIP devices. 
When it comes to the mobile experience, the iPhone 
has dramatically changed the perception of what mobile 
devices can do, and who is using them. Now in addition 
to business users, consumers are more likely to want the 
advanced capabilities of a smartphone for everything from 
mobile banking to iTunes access. 
“While exploits targeting the iPhone have circulated 
publicly, I’m somewhat surprised that there haven’t been 
more attacks to date,” said Cross. “Financial motivation 
and increased adoption will increase attacks to smart-
phones in the years to come. As more payment infrastruc-
ture gets placed on these devices, they will become a more 
attractive target.”
Dave Amster, vice president of security investigations 
for Equifax also sees the security challenges presented by 
mobile computing. “More and more financial transactions 
will take place over mobile devices,” said Amster. “Con-
sumers are ordering credit reports from their Blackberrys, 
which puts valuable information at risk. The challenge for 
businesses and banks is going to be maintaining secure 
mobile applications and ease of use at the same time.” 
Patrick Traynor, an assistant professor in the School 
of Computer Science at Georgia Tech and a member of 
GTISC, discussed the concept of the “digital wallet,” 
in which smartphones store personal identity, payment 
card information and more. Already in Japan, people 
use their cell phones at vending machines and subway 
token dispensers.  
According to Traynor, “malware will be injected onto 
cell phones to turn them into bots. Large cellular botnets 
could then be used to perpetrate a DoS attack against 
the core of the cellular network. But because the mobile 
communications field is evolving so quickly, it presents 
a unique opportunity to design security properly—an 
opportunity we missed with the PC.”
Traynor pointed out that most people buy a new mobile 
device every two years—a much shorter life cycle than 
the typical PC and Windows installation, which is closer 
to 10 years. 
“The short life cycle of mobile devices gives manu-
facturers, developers and the security community an 
opportunity to learn what works from a security 
standpoint and apply it to devices and applications more 
quickly,” said Traynor. “However, it is not going to be an 
easy problem to solve.” 
Traynor pointed to battery power as a primary security 
hurdle, “If you place antivirus software on a mobile 
device, it will run the battery down, so mobile security 
will require new approaches and partnerships between 
manufacturers, carriers and application developers.” 
Researchers like Traynor and Cross expect open 
standards for handset security to gain more ground in 2009. 
They both cited Google’s Android platform for mobile 
applications as a step in the right direction. Android 
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The evolving cyber crime economy
“The Web-based attack platforms come in a variety of packages and are available for lease, purchase or 
any payment model in between,” said Ollmann. “And for those criminals that don’t want to host their attack 
platforms, managed service providers have emerged to rent existing installations for global malware  
delivery. Some of the MSPs charge on a per-click basis just like Web advertising.” 
Gunter Ollmann - Chief Security Strategist, IBM Internet Security Systems
Members of the security community have been 
engaged in debate over responsibility for security 
education and potential regulatory schemes to govern 
online behavior. The conversation may only become more 
heated in 2009. While the decentralized and open nature 
of the Internet can be extremely positive characteristics, 
malicious criminals are threatening the very foundations 
of the Internet. 
makes the mobile application development environment 
publicly available so that it becomes easier for application 
developers to apply security to programs designed for 
smartphones. Traynor and Cross also support a layered 
approach to security on mobile devices that encompasses 
carriers, manufacturers and application developers. 
Sources of cyber crime will become increasingly 
organized and profit-driven in the years ahead. Gunter 
Ollmann, chief security strategist for IBM Internet Security 
Systems describes today’s (and tomorrow’s) cyber crimi-
nals as “an international conglomerate of professionally 
trained authors motivated by high profit.”
You can buy, lease, subscribe and even pay-as-you-go 
to obtain the latest malware kits, which are much more 
sophisticated than their predecessors. “Malware transi-
tioned to the criminal world just over three years ago,” 
said Ollmann. “The new sophisticated malware-for-sale 
features encrypted command and control channels, built-
in Web services for hosting phishing content, man-in-the-
browser proxy engines for identity theft, along with drive 
scanners for capturing sellable data like email addresses 
and credit card details.”
Ollmann reports that several malware kits are supported 
by product guarantees and service level agreements. 
A few malware developers are even offering multiple 
language “customer support” in order to reach a wider 
audience of criminals. New Web-based attack platforms 
have been developed in tandem so that social engineering 
and end-user action are no longer required for exploita-
tion. All of these trends are expected to evolve further in 
the coming year.
The managed service approach basically extends the 
functionality of a malware purchase. One malicious man-
aged service model revolves around breaking CAPTCHAs 
(Completely Automated Public Turing test to tell Computers 
and Humans Apart). CAPTCHAs are used to prevent 
brute-force attacks and fraudulent account creation on 
Web sites and require end users to correctly enter a string 
of characters and login details before access is granted. As 
CAPTCHA systems were continuously broken by attackers 
and then subsequently strengthened against compromise, 
the cyber crime MSPs saw a business opportunity.
“The managed service operators provide cheap human 
labor to battle through CAPTCHAs,” said Ollmann. 
"These predominantly Russian-operated entities offer pay 
scales starting at $1 per 1,000 CAPTCHAs broken, and 
provide an extensible API structure for easy integration 
into malware. This combined approach will continue in 
the future.”
Ollmann divides the cyber criminal industry into 
three tiers:
Low-level criminals who use kits to create  • 
the specific malware required for their  
targeted crimes.
Skilled developers and collectives of technical • 
experts creating new components to embed 
within their commercial malware creation kits.
Top-tier managed service providers that wrap • 
new services around malware kits to increase 
propagation and enable organized fraud on a 
global scale, feeding gains back into existing 
money laundering chains.
He warns of a tough road ahead in the battle 
against malware.
Expert opinion on  
Internet security education and regulation
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Michael Barrett, the chief information officer for 
PayPal frames the debate in concrete terms, “Even if 
customers are confident in PayPal’s security, but still don’t 
think the Internet as a whole is safe, then we all lose.” 
Barrett believes a robust debate will go on for the next few 
years between public and private entities about how best 
to protect the Internet ecosystem. “I think we have about 
10 years to figure out how to structure Internet security 
principles and regulation before the problem of online 
fraud and cyber crime completely gets away from us,” he 
said.
The borderless nature of the Internet, the astounding 
growth of online users, the difficulty in establishing trusted 
identity online and the lack of standardization around 
protection all contribute to the challenge of developing a 
regulatory scheme. But phishing and e-crime losses may 
compel interested parties to action. 
So what would Internet security regulation look like? 
According to Barrett, it could follow the model of road 
and airline safety…
“We can even draw comparisons between car insur-
ance and antivirus software,” said Barrett, who believes 
that voluntary car insurance penetration would be about 
the same as antivirus software. “Most people buy car 
insurance because it is mandated by the government. 
Perhaps we need a similar mandate for keeping security 
protection up-to-date.”
Barrett was also quick to point out his optimism when 
it comes to security. “I believe phishing is a completely 
preventable crime when you combine technology with 
education,” he said. “Our anti-phishing efforts with Yahoo 
over a 10 month period prevented more than 85 million 
phishing emails from ever reaching the intended victim. 
And if we can teach end users some simple rules, it will 
have a big impact.”
With a focus on preventing phishing emails from arriv-
ing in the inbox, PayPal now uses DomainKeys Identified 
Mail (DKIM) and Sender Policy Framework (SPF) to sign 
its customer emails. When the major ISPs see an email 
supposedly from PayPal—but without the proper DKIM 
or SPF signature—they block it.
“Technology is one piece of the puzzle, regulation is 
another and user education is the final hurdle,” said 
Barrett. “Just 15 years ago, Mosaic 1.0 was released and 
the Internet as we know it was born. Back then about 1,000 
people were using the Web. Today, there are more than 
one billion active Internet users. Yet despite this explosive 
growth, we’ve had no formal education about safe behavior 
on the Internet, and the security industry has never 
spoken with one voice.” 
Mustaque Ahamad, the director of GTISC, supports 
a combination of security awareness, education and 
personal responsibility. “Although we can argue that end 
users could do more to protect themselves and the online 
community, we should also expect more from the security 
industry in terms of viable solutions,” said Ahamad.
Howard A. Schmidt believes the government should 
play a role in security regulation for cyber defense. “The 
government should establish a regulatory construct 
for assessing the state of security and setting minimum 
standards of security for entities that are part of our 
critical infrastructure,” he said. “The goal would be to 
identify deficiencies and assess certain sectors with a 
security grade. It could be supported with a tax credit for 
businesses that make the grade. Most importantly, any 
government involvement should not inhibit innovation 
or investment.” 
“We can think of security as the environment of the Inter-
net and cyber crime as the pollution that could effectively 
kill it,” said Jon Ramsey of SecureWorks. “The problem is 
bigger than industry, end users and government boundar-
ies. That’s why GTISC research and the public/private col-
laboration it promotes is so important to finding solutions 
to the threats of the future.”
“If you own a dangerous old jalopy that can’t pass emission standards and you want to drive it around your 
private 10-acre field, that’s fine. But as soon as you take that unsafe car out onto the public road, you 
become a threat to others,” said Barrett. “The same is true of a PC running Windows 98 and Internet  
Explorer 3 without any meaningful AV or firewall protection. If that machine never connects to the Internet, 
fine. But once it does, it can become infected and in turn be used to compromise more machines.”
Michael Barrett - Chief Information Security Officer, PayPal
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